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Abstract
There is strong empirical evidence showing that political relations have an impact on
aggregate bilateral trade flows. In this paper, we show that the impact is heterogeneous
across products, depending on product characteristics. Specifically, imported products
used as intermediate inputs intensively may be more sensitive to adverse shocks. This
is particularly relevant in the current context of increased international input linkages.
We sketch a simple theoretical framework and test the mechanism in reduced-form.
We implement a difference-in-differences approach with monthly trade flows and
a novel dataset of diplomatic incidents. We find that a negative shock to political
relations leads to a general decrease in trade flows, and that the response is larger
for products in markets with low price gaps to alternative sourcing partners and high
direct and indirect imported input use.
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“Multinationals are very nervous now, and they should be. [...] In the past, only some
sectors—mining, oil and gas, commodity companies—had to worry about geopolitics. Now
companies that make fizzy drinks or handbags or chocolate are finding their supply chains,
their markets, their operations completely blown apart by geopolitical risks and unfavorable
treatment.”
— Mark Leonard, co-founder of the European Council on Foreign Relations1
1 Introduction
In the past, primary commodities like oil and gas accounted for the great majority of
inputs trade — and those were considered as highly related to geopolitics. Industries
heavily dependent on these inputs were exposed to potential shocks to bilateral political
relations with important suppliers. In recent decades, however, the range of products that
are traded as intermediate inputs has increased vastly, with trade in intermediate inputs
accounting for about two thirds of world trade (Johnson and Noguera, 2012). Suddenly,
food, beverage and apparel producers may be concerned with changes in political relations,
as their production processes depend more heavily on imported inputs. In this paper, we
investigate whether the heterogeneity of the impact of politics on trade can be traced back
to the use of import inputs in different industries.
There is ample empirical evidence that political relations have an impact on bilateral
trade. This paper proposes a mechanism that explains why certain industries may be
more affected than others, particularly relevant in the context of increased inputs linkages
between countries. We sketch a simple theoretical framework that illustrates the forces at
play. Given alternative sourcing partners, imported inputs that are important in direct and
indirect use in the domestic economy could see a stronger impact. We test this mechanism
empirically in reduced form using monthly import data and a novel event dataset on
diplomatic incidents.
There is a growing literature studying the nexus of political relations and trade. Several
papers have shown that diplomatic ties and state visits have an impact on bilateral trade
flows. For instance, Rose (2007) finds that the presence of embassies and consulates is
positively correlated with exports, with each additional consulate being associated with
around 6–10 % increase in trade, ceteris paribus. Nitsch (2007) shows that official visits of
heads of states have on average a positive effect on export of an 8–10 % increase. However,
these results are very sensitive to the type of visits and much less robust for imports. Fuchs
and Klann (2013), on the other hand, estimate the effect of foreign visits of the Dalai
1From “The great unraveling of globalization”, Washington Post by Jeffrey Rothfeder on April 24, 2015.
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Lama on the host countries’ subsequent trade with China. They find a significant effect
for meetings with the countries’ top political leaders, however the effect lasts only for one
year.
These papers mostly focus on the effect of diplomatic ties on aggregate trade flows. Fuchs
and Klann (2013) acknowledge a stronger effect for certain industries, such as machinery
and transport equipment, for which negotiations over a purchase are commonly carried
out during the course of high-rank trade talks between national representatives and trade
delegations. The external validity of this explanation for other countries is however ques-
tionable. In a follow-up paper, Davis et al. (2016) demonstrate that, at least in the case
of China and India, political relations have a stronger effect on imports and exports for
state-owned firms, for which the government can directly influence their sales’ behaviors.
A number of recent papers explicitly emphasize sectoral heterogeneity in response to
a change in political relations. Heilmann (2016) studies the effect of various boycott
campaigns on trade. Among others examples, he analyzes the effect of the boycott of
Danish products in some Muslim-majority countries in 2006 by using a synthetic control
group methodology. The greatest decline in trade is found for consumer goods and highly
branded signature goods. Capital and intermediate goods are not boycotted in the long
run, indicating that the boycotts are driven by consumers. Mityakov et al. (2012) analyze
the effect of changes in political distance to the US on trade flows from 1962 to 2000. A
one standard deviation increase in political distance, as measured through similarity of UN
General Assembly voting, is associated with a 14 percent decrease in US imports. Inter-
estingly, though, they find that over the period of interest this effect is almost exclusively
driven by imports of petroleum and few strategic commodities. American firms, diversify
their import of crude oil significantly away from the political opponents of the US, even
after controlling for wars, sanctions, and tariffs. Michaels and Zhi (2010) study the impact
of the French opposition to the Iraq war in 2003 on bilateral flows between the US and
France. They find evidence that French exports to the US dropped significantly, especially
for those goods used mostly as intermediate inputs. They explain the effect for inputs by
changes in managers’ attitudes that led them to make decisions that reduced bilateral sales
and purchases of inputs.
We contribute to this growing literature studying the heterogeneity of the response of trade
to political relations in two ways. We show in a simple framework why certain industries
may be more prone to disruption by political tensions and test the main implication empir-
ically. We do so by using a novel database on diplomatic events that allows us to identify
the heterogeneous responses by industry.
The simple framework assumes a two-sector and many-countries world where a “political
shock” may affect the sourcing decision of imported inputs. The model shows that this
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effect may be heterogeneous across sectors even for homogeneous shocks. The key deter-
minant of the heterogeneity is the degree to which the imported input is used directly and
indirectly in the affected economy, and whether viable alternative sourcing countries exist.
We test the proposed mechanism in reduced form in a difference-in-differences framework.
We exploit variation in monthly data on imports and the incidence of bilateral diplomatic
tensions, using a novel dataset that records diplomatic events found in press releases
collected from the websites of the foreign ministries of five politically and economically
important countries, i.e. France, UK, Russia, Germany and Japan.2 The diplomatic events
in question are the summoning, expulsion or recalling of foreign or own diplomats. These
actions are taken in times of sudden and unexpected bilateral political tensions and are
thus a good proxy for “political shocks”.
A recent example that emphasizes the suitability of this proxy is the political aftermath
of the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal. In early March 2018 the former Russian spy
and his daughter were poisoned with a military-grade nerve agent of a type developed by
Russia. The British Prime Minister made a statement in Parliament, seeking explanation
from Russia. By March 14, the UK expelled 23 Russian diplomats identified as undeclared
intelligence officers and suspended all planned high-level contact. On March 17, Russia
summoned the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Russia and 33 members of the diplomatic
staff in Moscow were declared persona non grata, to be expelled from Russia within a
week. The UK then closed its Consulate in St. Petersburg, and the British Council in
Moscow.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we sketch a simple framework that
formalizes the mechanism, where those imported inputs that are used intensively directly
and indirectly in an economy are more sensitive to political tensions, given that viable
sourcing alternatives exist. We describe the data we use to test this mechanism in section
3 and section 4 lays out the empirical strategy. The econometric results are discussed in
section 5, while robustness tests are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
A simple framework can help understanding the mechanisms at work.
Assume a world with a home country and a number of foreign countries. The home
country’s economy is made up of 2 sectors, x and y. Each sector uses labor and two
imported inputs, m and n, for its production. The foreign countries offer m and n at
different prices, such that there is a ranking of cheapest to most expensive for each input.
2The United States and China do not make this information easily accessible: while the former does not
publish these events at all, the later only does so for the most recent occasions.
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Let εm and εn describe the price gap between the cheapest and the second cheapest source.
The production in the home country is of Cobb-Douglas type such that:
x = lλxx y
βx
x m
γx
x n
δx
x and y = l
λy
y x
αy
y m
γy
y n
δy
y (1)
where λx + βx + γx + δx = λy + αy + γy + δy = 1
and the home country’s aggregate output is given by
AO = xηy1−η with 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 (2)
For the purpose of the argument assume the home country sources m and n from the
same foreign country initially, as it is the cheapest source available for both inputs. Then
consider a negative shock to political relations between the home country and this foreign
country. Assume the shock translates into a uniform increase in the price of m and n,
driven by an increase in variable trade costs. The intensity of the political shock, ζ, is
measured as the difference between the price of inputs from this foreign country before
and after the shock. The home country aims at minimizing the effect of the shock on
aggregate output, with two possible options for each input:
1. the price increase leads to a reduction of imports from the foreign country;
2. the home country starts sourcing from another foreign country, subject to a switching
cost ω > 0.
Following equations (1) and (2), we can express the benefits of switching suppliers for
input m as follows:∣∣∣∣∂ log(AO)∂pm
∣∣∣∣
switch
−
∣∣∣∣∂ log(AO)∂pm
∣∣∣∣
switch
=
(ζ − εm) 1
pm
(η(γx + βxγy) + (1− η)(γy + αyγx))
and for input n accordingly. If the benefits outweigh the switching costs the home country
switches supplier, i.e. when
(ζ − εm) 1
pm
(η(γx + βxγy) + (1− η)(γy + αyγx)) > ω
For a given ω and ζ , the switch depends on:
1. the sign of ζ − εm, i.e. whether the price change is larger than the initial price gap;
2. the magnitude of the term (η(γx + βxγy) + (1− η)(γy + αyγx)), i.e. the importance
of this input in direct and indirect use in the home country.
For ζ − εm < 0, the home country does not switch. If, however, the initial price gap is
smaller than the price change, the importance of the input for aggregate output determines
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whether a switch occurs. A high direct and indirect use of the input leads to a significant
change in aggregate output, that may be larger than the fixed costs for switching. Hence,
even for the same shock ζ and same fixed costs of switching ω, imports of inputs m and
n may differ in their response to the shock due to differences in the initial price gap and
their use in the home country’s economy.
The simple model displays one mechanism through which political shocks may have a
heterogeneous effect on trade flows. In the real world, however, economies have many
sectors, countries usually source inputs from many suppliers, and trade flows are usually
observed at a level of aggregation that may hide switches from positive to zero flows. Yet,
even with these additional complexities, the following hypothesis should hold:
Hypothesis A negative shock to bilateral political relations leads to a general decrease
in trade flows. The response should be larger for products in markets with low price gap
and high imported input use.
3 Data
We test the hypothesis using the incidence of diplomatic events as a proxy for bilateral
negative political shocks, in combination with country-level data on monthly bilateral
trade and input-output tables to capture the direct and indirect use of imported inputs.
3.1 Data on diplomatic events
As discussed above, summoning or recalling high-level diplomats is used as a diplomatic
instrument to signal discontent and put pressure on a foreign government. We collected
data on the actions taken by the countries of Germany, France, United Kingdom, Japan
and the Russian Federation, as they are lead actors in the political arena as well as in
trade, combining roughly 25 % of world imports between them.3 The five countries have
repeatedly made use of summoning or recalling of diplomats as an instrument of foreign
policy. We have collected information on these events over the time period from 2010
until 2014 from official press releases available on the website of each Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,4 using keyword searches such as “ambassador summoned”, “ambassador recalled”,
“withdraw of diplomatic staff”, “embassy closure”.5
3Three of the five countries—France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation—are permanent
members of the UN Security Council. Notably absent from the list of countries are the United States and
China, whose foreign policy clearly shapes global events and likely influences trade flows. Unfortunately,
however, the US State Department does not make public instances in which these instrument of diplomacy
are used. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs does publish press releases but it is technically difficult to
retrieve them en masse, as the website does not allow searches of its archive.
4Appendix A.1 lists the direct weblinks to the different websites.
5A diplomat may be summoned or recalled for different reasons, as some examples of events show:
In November 2010, Russia summoned the Canadian ambassador over new visa requirements for Russian
nationals; In February 2011, France summoned the Mexican ambassador regarding the situation of the
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3.2 Data on monthly trade flows
Given the characteristics of our events we expect a short-term impact on trade flows,
similar to the observed effect of Dalai Lama visits in Fuchs and Klann (2013) and Du et al.
(2017).6 In consequence, we opt for an analysis using data on monthly trade flows from
UN Comtrade (United Nations Statistics Division, 2015). For the purpose of this study, we
extract data on the imports of France, UK, Russia, Germany, Japan vis-a`-vis the rest of the
world—241 countries and territories—from January 2010 to December 2014, totaling 60
months.
3.3 Imported input use
The simple model in section 2 postulates that one key determinant of the response to the
shock is the direct and indirect import use. The term (η(γx + βxγy) + (1− η)(γy + αyγx))
can easily be translated into a multi-sector setting with domestic production of inputs as
IIU = Aimp(I −Adom)−1F (3)
where Aimp is the matrix of the values of imported inputs by sector and Adom the matrix of
the values of domestic inputs by sector. F is the vector of final consumption shares. Each
element of the vector IIU denotes the required value of a foreign input for 1 unit value of
final consumption in the domestic economy. The higher the necessary imported value, the
more important is the input for the country’s economy. We compute the measure for the
five countries of interest using the global input-output table for the year 2008 from the
World Input Output Database (Timmer et al., 2015).7 The table covers 34 sectors, for both
manufacturing and services.8 Figure 1 shows the histogram and the ranking of the most
important imported inputs for France.9 The ranking and magnitude are sensible, with
petroleum, services and manufacturing inputs dominating the top ranks.
French-national Florence Cassez; In July 2012, Japan summoned the Chinese ambassador to protest against
the entry of patrol ships into disputed territorial waters; In March 2013, Germany summoned the Chinese
ambassador to condemn an attack on a German journalist; In June 2014, the British Foreign Office summoned
the Egyptian ambassador following an Egyptian court guilty verdicts against Egyptian and international
journalists. More details on these cases and a complete list of events can be found in appendix A.2.
6It is also likely to have a much less severe impact than military conflicts or more structural security issues
like domestic political instability (Martin et al., 2008a,b, 2012).
7Relying on data from 2008 ensures the exogeneity of the input coefficients for the event study.
8To match the aggregation level of the dependence measures, we aggregate the data on trade flows to the
16 manufacturing sectors in WIOD.
9We also compute the measure for the most detailed openly available input-output table, for the United
States from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, with data on 389 industries, and compare it with the respective
measure computed using WIOD data. The results are displayed in table 4 in appendix B. The direct comparison
shows consistent figures by ranking and magnitude across these different levels of aggregation. Unfortunately
input-output tables of this high detail are a rarity for other countries.
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(a) Histogram of imported input use
WIOD Industry
Imported
input use
1 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 166.96
2 Transport Equipment 119.51
3 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 83.24
4 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities 82.41
5 Chemicals and Chemical Products 76.27
6 Construction 62.07
7 Electrical and Optical Equipment 59.47
8 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 42.79
9 Machinery, Nec 37.32
10 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, 35.99
Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
(b) Top 10 imported inputs
Figure 1: Histogram and top 10 imported input use per 1000 USD GDP for France
4 Empirical strategy
Our aim is to analyze how imports respond to a negative shock to political relations, and
test whether imports in sectors with a low price gap and high import input use decrease
relatively more than imports in other sectors. To do so we use a difference-in-differences
approach. Our dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly imports by industry and
source country. The treatment is a negative political shock, coded as described above, and
hence treated observations are import flows from a source country after a negative shock.
We take import flows from other countries that are never treated as the control group.10
This obviously would be a problematic assumption if we were only interested in the
estimated coefficient of this treatment. Import flows could be redirected from the treated
source country to another source country from the control group and thus bias upwards
the estimated coefficient. However, we are primarily interested in the interaction of the
treatment with country-industry and industry-specific variables, which should not be
affected.
10As there is a small number of country pairs that do not entertain bilateral diplomatic representations, e.g.
North Korea and France do not have official diplomatic relations, we only consider country pairs that do have
embassies or consulates in one another in the analysis.
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The equation we estimate is
log(Xodkt) = δ0 · Treatmentodt
+ δ1 · Treatmentodt × log(IIUdk)
+ δ2 · Treatmentodt × Concentrationk
+ δ3 · Treatmentodt × log(IIUdk)× Concentrationk
+ Γ + odkt (4)
We interact the Treatment variable with a proxy for the industry-specific price gap, Concen-
trationk, and the country-industry-specific imported input use measure, IIUdk. To measure
the price gap on the sourcing market we compute a Herfindahl index of total exports across
source countries with trade data for 2010. The underlying assumption is that the greater
the Herfindahl index, the lower is the level of competition, and thus the higher is the
price gap in this industry. We normalize the imported input use measure by the respective
country’s average imported input use and take the logarithm. Thus the interpretation of
the coefficients is straight forward, as the benchmark is an industry with an infinitely small
price gap and the average imported input use of the importer. We control for unobservable
characteristics using different sets of time, importing country, source country and industry
fixed effects, denoted by Γ.
The coefficient on the Treatment variable, δ0, is the average effect for the benchmark, i.e.
a low price gap and the average imported input use of the importer, which we expect to
have a negative sign. The main test of our prediction comes from the interaction between
Treatment × log(IIU)dk. In our simple framework, we show that the effect should be
magnified by the degree of imported input use, given a small price gap. The coefficient of
the interaction between Treatment × log(IIU)dk, δ1, is therefore expected to be negative.
The remaining interaction terms are necessary for the test, but the interpretation of their
coefficients, δ2 and δ3, is not explicitly guided by the framework. We would, however,
expect positive coefficients. In principle, lower concentration, i.e. higher price gaps, should
yield a lower response of import flows and a more muted influence for those industries
with high imported input use.
5 Results
The results from estimating equation (4) are presented in table 1. There are a total of 40
events. For those country pairs for which we observe several events over the period, we use
the date of the first one to construct the treatment variable. The two main coefficients of
interest, δ0 and δ1, are negative and very stable across specifications with different sets of
fixed effects Γ. The effects are in line with the prediction from the framework in section 2.
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Dependent variable:
log(imports)
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment −0.083∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗ −0.083∗∗
(0.026) (0.033) (0.035)
Treatment x log(IIU) −0.069∗∗∗ −0.051∗ −0.061∗∗
(0.021) (0.028) (0.031)
Treatment x Concentration 0.699∗∗ 0.568 0.672
(0.301) (0.407) (0.446)
Treatment x Concentration x log(IIU) 0.571∗∗∗ 0.426∗ 0.486∗∗
(0.168) (0.218) (0.243)
Fixed effects ctry-dt, ctry-ind-dt, ctry-ind-dt,
pair-ind pair-ind pair-ind-mo
Observations 410,303 410,303 410,303
R2 0.913 0.951 0.964
Adjusted R2 0.909 0.925 0.922
Note: Robust standard errors: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1: Event study - Political shock and heterogeneous effect
In column (1) we include importing country × date, sourcing country × date, and country
pair × industry fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics. In columns (2)
and (3) we are even more restrictive and augment the country × date fixed effects by an
industry, and calendar month dimension. While this leaves very little variation in the data,
the estimated coefficients persist.
The estimates of δ0 range between −0.074 and −0.083, which translates into an average
decrease in imports in reaction to a shock to political relations for the reference group in
the preferred specification (1) of exp(−0.083)− 1 = −8%. Although, as described above,
the estimate have to be taken with caution, the magnitude of the effects mirrors very well
the results from related literature. Michaels and Zhi (2010) find an 8 % drop in bilateral
trade between France and the US in response to the Iraq war, while Nitsch (2007) reports
an increase of 8–10 % in exports after the visit of a head of state.
The estimates of δ1 range between −0.051 and −0.069, which corresponds to an additional
exp(−0.069)− 1 = −6.7% decrease in imports for a sector with import use twice as high
as the average for the preferred specification.
The coefficients δ2 and δ3 have both positive coefficients, confirming the intuition that
lower concentration in an industry yields a lower response of import flows, and a smaller
role for imported input use.
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Dependent variable:
log(imports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment −0.082∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗ −0.098∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.061) (0.040)
— x log(IIU) −0.079∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.042∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
— x Concentration 0.624∗ 0.452 0.675∗∗ 0.697∗∗ 0.680∗∗
(0.331) (0.343) (0.314) (0.302) (0.304)
— x Concentration x log(IIU) 0.563∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗ 0.364∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.182) (0.177) (0.169) (0.168)
— x Labor Intensity 0.061
(0.088)
— x Skill Intensity 0.084
(0.155)
Fixed effects ctry-dt, ctry-dt, ctry-dt, ctry-dt, ctry-dt,
pair-ind pair-ind pair-ind pair-ind pair-ind
Sample Top 50 w/o Arab league w/o Russia all all
Observations 237,463 371,827 359,753 410,303 410,303
R2 0.929 0.918 0.914 0.913 0.913
Adjusted R2 0.927 0.914 0.910 0.908 0.908
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2: Robustness test — Country samples and industry-specific measures
6 Robustness Tests
We conduct a series of robustness test to validate the findings against a number of potential
concerns, related to the sample or other confounding variables.
In table 2 columns (1) – (3) we re-estimate equation (4) on three subsamples. One
concern is that the coefficients from our benchmark estimation are driven by outliers,
small economies that for other reasons than bilateral political relations decrease their
exports to the 5 countries of interest after being “treated” by one of the political events
described above. In column (1) we report the coefficients when selecting only the top 50
largest economies out of the 241 countries present in the data as sourcing countries. The
coefficients on the terms of interest retain the same sign and stay within a standard error
of the baseline results in table 1, despite the number of observations being cut by 42 %.
A further concern could be that the results are driven by the events occurring in connection
with the so-called Arab spring, which falls right into the time window of the data we use.
The summoning of the respective Ambassadors was relatively common, resulting in 31
such recorded instances.11 The events coincided with security crises in these countries that
11See appendix A.2 for the list of events.
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could equally cause a sharp decline in imports, driving the reported results. We therefore
re-run the estimation of equation (4) on only non-Arab league countries. We find that the
concern is not merited, as the coefficients in column (2) remain very similar.
Another concern could be on the side of the importing country, as we were only able to
collect data on political events from 5 major geopolitical players. One of the countries,
Russia, could be of particular concern, as it could be argued that the country conducts
its foreign policy structurally differently from Western countries and Japan. We therefore
rerun the estimation without events involving the Russian Federation. Column (3) shows
that this concern is also not merited.
A different concern involves the mechanism itself. The results could be driven by industry-
specific factors that are not captured by the employed fixed effects. It could be that certain
industries, labor or skill intensive ones, react differently to a sudden change in bilateral
political relations than others. We test this assertion by estimating equation (4) with an
additional interaction of indicators derived from the WIOD dataset on the labor and skill
intensity of sectors. Columns (4) and (5) in table 2 show that these concerns again are
not merited. Neither the interaction with labor intensity, nor the interaction with skill
intensity are significant, and the coefficients of interest retain the same sign and stay
within a standard error of the results of the benchmark specification reported in table 1.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature that studies the impact of political relations on
trade. There is ample empirical evidence that political relations indeed influence the trad-
ing behavior between countries. In this paper we show how this impact is heterogeneous
depending on characteristics of the imported products.
Specifically, we show how imports of those products that are used as inputs in a domestic
economy intensively, both directly and indirectly, are more sensitive to shocks than others.
We set up a simple theoretical framework that exhibits the mechanism and then test the
mechanism empirically in a reduced form setting. In a difference-in-differences framework
we estimate the effect of political shocks to import flows of five economically and politically
important countries using a novel dataset on diplomatic incidents, such as the summoning
and recalling of an ambassador or other high-level diplomats. The econometric results
provide evidence for the mechanism exhibited by the model. Political relations have a
heterogeneous impact on imported inputs, driven by the importing country’s direct and
indirect use of imported input, given the ease to switch sourcing partners.
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The theoretical framework depicts a very stylized version of the real world. While the
simplicity is attractive to highlight the mechanism at play, there are obvious simplifications
that could be addressed in more involved models. In particular, one could imagine a richer
characterization of the inner workings of the economy and explicitly model firms’ decisions
in a political economy framework. As the main point is to establish the basic mechanism
at play, this is, however, beyond the scope of this current project.
Looking at the current state of the world of bilateral political relations and the status quo
of research on the nexus of politics and trade, we see ample room for further research.
As hinted at above, future work could investigate the firms’ role, taking cues from the
literature on the political economy of protectionism. Furthermore, we wonder about
underlying mechanisms that may affect the exporting side, as hinted at in current research
on sanctions. We refer these intriguing questions to future research.
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A Press releases from Ministries of Foreign Affairs
A.1 Links to websites of Foreign Ministries
• France: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/
• Germany: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/
• Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp
• Russian Federation: http://www.mid.ru/
• United Kingdom:
http://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/foreign-commonwealth-office
A.2 List of events
Table 3: List of events
Date Origin Destination Event type Comments
18/02/2010 France Israel summon CA about murder of a Hamas member in Dubai
01/03/2010 Russia Estonia summon Ambassador unfriendly action by authorities
14/07/2010 Russia United States summon Ambassador protest apprehension of Russian citizen
abroad
10/08/2010 Russia Thailand summon Ambassador extradition of citizen to USA
01/09/2010 UK Kenya summon HC about President Bashir of Sudan’s visit to
Kenya
27/09/2010 Japan China summon Ambassador express concerns about detained Japanese
nationals in China
14/10/2010 Russia Canada summon CA confiscation and arrest of crew of cruise
ship
01/11/2010 Russia Japan summon Ambassador protest to protest presidents travel to dis-
puted island
03/11/2010 Russia Canada summon CA new visa requirements
19/11/2010 Russia Canada summon Ambassador protest about damaged consulate
17/12/2010 Russia United States summon Ambassador military exercise in South Korea
17/12/2010 Russia South Korea summon Ambassador military exercise in South Korea
22/12/2010 Germany Belarus summon Ambassador opposition arrests
20/01/2011 Germany Belarus summon Ambassador accusations of plot
11/02/2011 France Mexico summon Ambassador concerning situation of Florence Cassez
17/02/2011 France Iran summon Ambassador concern about Spanish diplomate arrest
21/02/2011 UK Libya summon Ambassador concern about violence in Lybia
02/03/2011 UK Yemen summon CA concern over escalating violence in Yemen
04/03/2011 Germany Taiwan summon Ambassador executions
16/03/2011 UK Libya summon Ambassador discuss situation in Lybia
24/03/2011 Germany Yemen summon Ambassador political situation
19/04/2011 UK Malawi summon CA about considering declaring the British HC
persona non grata
26/04/2011 Germany Syria summon Ambassador violence in Syria
Table 3 — Continued on next page
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Table 3 — Continued from previous page
27/04/2011 France Syria summon Ambassador condemnation of violence in Syria
27/04/2011 UK Syria summon Ambassador stop violence
28/04/2011 UK Malawi expulsion of HC after expulsion of British HC
01/05/2011 UK Libya expulsion of Ambas-
sador
following attack on British residence in
Tripoli
13/05/2011 UK Syria summon Ambassador concern about the ongoing situation in
Syria
25/05/2011 Japan South Korea summon Ambassador protest against members of parliament on
disputed islands
31/05/2011 Germany Syria summon Ambassador torture of children and teenagers
02/06/2011 Russia Pakistan summon Ambassador demand investigation into deaths of four
citizens
04/06/2011 Germany Yemen closure of German em-
bassy
due to dangerous internal conflict
28/06/2011 UK Syria summon Ambassador over allegations of Syrian Embassy intimi-
dation
06/07/2011 Russia Sweden summon CA protest court ruling
10/07/2011 France Syria recall its Ambassador
for consultations
protest against demonstrations in front of
the French embassies
12/07/2011 Germany Syria summon Ambassador voilence and attacks on embassies
13/07/2011 UK Syria summon Ambassador ensure Syrian Ambassador protects diplo-
matic mission
27/07/2011 France Burundi summon Ambassador Patrice Faye sentence
27/07/2011 UK Libya expulsion of all diplo-
matic staff
condemnation of Qadhafi’s regime
11/08/2011 France Ukraine summon Ambassador About the Timochenko case
25/08/2011 Japan China summon Ambassador protest against Chinese boat in territorial
waters
29/09/2011 Germany Iran summon Ambassador protest death penalty sentence against pas-
tor
13/10/2011 UK Syria summon Ambassador concern about reports suggesting harass-
ment and intimidation of Syrian diplomats
in UK
14/11/2011 France Syria summon Ambassador concerning assaults in diplomatic entities
in Syria
15/11/2011 France Syria recall its Ambassador
for consultations
concerns about situation in Syria
16/11/2011 France Israel summon Ambassador about the raid in Gaza
29/11/2011 UK Iran summon CA storming of British Embassy in Teheran
30/11/2011 France Iran recall its Ambassador
for consultations
concerns about assaults in British embassy
30/11/2011 UK Iran expulsion of all diplo-
matic staff
in response to the assault on the British
Embassy in Teheran (“closing of Iranian
embassy in London by UK”)
30/11/2011 UK Iran closure of British Am-
bassy(Teheran)
in response to the assault on the British
Embassy in Teheran
16/12/2011 UK Uruguay summon Ambassador response to 25th Dec Mercosur statement
about Falkland Islands
06/02/2012 UK Syria summon Ambassador Siege in Homs; condemnation of atrocities
Table 3 — Continued on next page
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Table 3 — Continued from previous page
07/02/2012 France Syria recall its Ambassador
for consultations
concerns about situation in Syria
07/02/2012 Germany Syria summon Ambassador spying on opposition in Germany
09/02/2012 Germany Syria expulsion of diplo-
mats
four embassy staffers expelled
20/02/2012 France Rwanda recall its Ambassador
for consultations
Kigali refuses to accept Helene Le Cal as
new French Ambassador
22/02/2012 UK Syria summon Ambassador stop violence in Homs
28/02/2012 France Belarus summon Ambassador protest against Bielorus’ decision to expel
Polish and UE ambassadors
29/02/2012 UK Belarus recall its Ambassador
for consultations
Belarus’ decision to recall their Ambas-
sadors to Poland and the EU in response to
EU sanctions
29/02/2012 UK Belarus summon Ambassador Belarus’ decision to recall their Ambas-
sadors to Poland and the EU in response to
EU sanctions
29/02/2012 UK Argentina summon CA response to Argentina’s threat to trade
01/03/2012 UK Syria withdrawal diplo-
matic staff
all diplomatic staff
03/03/2012 Germany Iran summon Ambassador call for release of pastor
21/03/2012 Japan Syria closure of Japanese
embassy
deteriorating security situation
06/04/2012 France Hungary summon Ambassador concerns about situation of foreign in-
vestors in Hungary
13/04/2012 UK North Korea summon Ambassador concerns about satellite launch
28/05/2012 UK Syria summon CA UK’s condemnation of the appalling mas-
sacre which took place in al-Houleh
29/05/2012 UK Syria expulsion CA and
diplomates
response to killing in el-Houleh
29/05/2012 Germany Syria expulsion of diplo-
mats
ambassador expelled
03/07/2012 Japan Russia summon Ambassador protest against visit of Russian prime min-
ister on disputed island
11/07/2012 Japan China summon Ambassador protest against entry of patrol ships into
disputed territorial waters
12/07/2012 Japan China summon Ambassador protest against entry of patrol ships into
disputed territorial waters (again..)
12/08/2012 Japan Russia summon Ambassador express concerns about situation in Georgia
14/08/2012 Germany Belarus summon Ambassador protest closing of Swedish embassy
15/08/2012 Japan China summon Ambassador protest against landing of activist ships on
disputed islands
20/09/2012 Germany Belarus summon Ambassador protest visa rejecting of election observers
03/10/2012 Russia Libya summon CA attack on embassy in Tripolis
30/10/2012 UK Burma summon CA concern about the violence in Rakhine
State
15/11/2012 UK Spain summon Ambassador concerns regarding incursions into British
Gibraltar Territorial Waters
03/12/2012 France Israel summon Ambassador concerns about settlement in colonies
03/12/2012 UK Israel summon Ambassador concern about settlement policy
Table 3 — Continued on next page
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03/12/2012 Germany North Korea summon Ambassador protest missile test
12/12/2012 UK North Korea summon Ambassador condemnation satellite launch
12/12/2012 Russia Nigeria summon Ambassador ship crew detained
12/12/2012 Germany North Korea summon Ambassador protest rocket launch
13/12/2012 Japan China summon Ambassador protest against entry of aircraft and ships
into disputed territory
08/02/2013 Japan China summon Ambassador protest against entry of Chinese ship into
territorial waters
13/02/2013 France Iraq call for minister meet-
ing
Situation of Nadir Dendoune
01/03/2013 Germany China summon Ambassador protest attack on German journalist
05/04/2013 Germany North Korea summon Ambassador concern about tensions on Korean penin-
sula
13/05/2013 Russia United States summon Ambassador unclear
01/07/2013 Germany United States summon Ambassador spying on Germany
11/07/2013 Russia Montenegro summon Ambassador situation of citizen
02/08/2013 UK Spain summon Ambassador delays at the Gibraltar border
20/08/2013 Japan Egypt summon Ambassador call for peaceful solution to domestic con-
flict
19/09/2013 Russia Netherlands summon Ambassador flying flag close to Russian shore
03/10/2013 Russia Libya withdrawal diplo-
matic staff
following attack on Russian embassy
08/10/2013 Russia Netherlands summon Ambassador protest about Russian diplomat attacked
16/10/2013 Russia Costa Rica summon Ambassador extradition of citizen to USA
21/10/2013 France US summon Ambassador spying on France
12/11/2013 Russia Poland summon Ambassador protest about violence around embassy
19/11/2013 UK Spain summon Ambassador serious incursion into British Gibraltar Ter-
ritorial Waters
23/11/2013 Japan China summon CA protest against Chinese declaration of ter-
ritorial extent
25/11/2013 Japan China summon Ambassador protest against Chinese declaration of ter-
ritorial extent
24/01/2014 France Ukraine summon Ambassador concerns about violence in Ukraine
24/01/2014 Germany Ukraine summon Ambassador concerns about violence in Ukraine
20/02/2014 UK Ukraine summon Ambassador over violence in Ukraine
24/02/2014 France Morocco summon Ambassador discuss situation of M.Hammouchi
25/02/2014 France Morocco Ministers meeting discuss about diplomatic incident with
French ambassador in DC
01/03/2014 UK Russia summon Ambassador concerns about situation in Ukraine
02/04/2014 UK Spain summon Ambassador concern at the incursion into British Gibral-
tar Territorial Waters
03/04/2014 Russia Germany summon Ambassador statement of German Minister of Finance
07/04/2014 UK Burma summon Ambassador call for urgent restoration of humanitarian
access
07/04/2014 Germany North Korea summon Ambassador concern about Nuclear test
29/04/2014 Germany Egypt summon Ambassador urgent appeal against death sentences
19/05/2014 UK Sudan summon CA concern at the decision to sentence MYII to
death for apostasy
Table 3 — Continued on next page
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26/05/2014 Japan China summon Ambassador protest against entry of military aircraft
into territory
11/06/2014 Japan China summon Ambassador protests against two Chinese military jets
which flew abnormally close to two Japan’s
Self Defence Force
12/06/2014 Japan China summon Ambassador protest against entry of military aircraft
into territory (again..)
23/06/2014 UK Egypt summon Ambassador concerning verdicts against Egyptian and
international journalists
13/07/2014 Russia Ukraine summon CA protest killing of citizen by shelling
17/07/2014 UK Spain summon Ambassador concern at the activity of a Spanish Navy
vessel in Gibraltar the day before
19/07/2014 UK Russia summon Ambassador urged Russian Authorities to secure access
to flight MH17 crash site
04/08/2014 UK Ethiopia summon CA concern about arrest of a Briton
15/08/2014 UK Russia summon Ambassador account for reports overnight of Russian
military vehicules crossing the border into
Ukraine
13/10/2014 UK Thailand summon CA concern about the investigation into mur-
ders of HW and DM
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B Imported input use with detailed input output data
BEA Industry Imported input use
1 Oil and gas extraction 13.12
2 Petroleum refineries 4.14
3 Insurance carriers 3.31
4 Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy manufacturing 1.73
5 Other motor vehicle parts manufacturing 1.62
6 Computer terminals and other computer peripheral equipment manufacturing 1.36
7 Pharmaceutical preparation manufacturing 1.26
8 Management consulting services 1.21
9 Other basic organic chemical manufacturing 1.19
10 Motor vehicle gasoline engine and engine parts manufacturing 1.17
11 Semiconductor and related device manufacturing 0.84
12 Other electronic component manufacturing 0.81
13 Motor vehicle transmission and power train parts manufacturing 0.81
14 Other plastics product manufacturing 0.72
15 Fishing, hunting and trapping 0.70
16 Telephone apparatus manufacturing 0.69
17 Plastics material and resin manufacturing 0.67
18 Primary smelting and refining of nonferrous metal (except copper and aluminum) 0.66
19 Other engine equipment manufacturing 0.64
20 Broadcast and wireless communications equipment 0.63
WIOD Industry Imported input use
1 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 115.50
2 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 55.49
3 Transport Equipment 50.20
4 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities 34.62
5 Financial Intermediation 34.11
6 Chemicals and Chemical Products 33.40
7 Construction 28.59
8 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 28.00
9 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 25.33
10 Electrical and Optical Equipment 22.66
11 Health and Social Work 22.26
12 Mining and Quarrying 19.20
13 Machinery, Nec 17.69
14 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 16.03
15 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 15.57
16 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 14.64
17 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing 14.52
18 Other Community, Social and Personal Services 13.52
19 Hotels and Restaurants 13.27
20 Real Estate Activities 11.81
Table 4: Top 20 US industries by imported input use with BEA (top) and WIOD data
(bottom) per $1000 GDP)
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